American Tianxia: A Chinese Term for American Power by Babones, Salvatore
American Tianxia: A Chinese Term for American 
Power 
BY SALVATORE BABONES 
 
 
China has always been the 800-pound gorilla of East Asia. The historical interstate system of 
East Asia was remarkably stable for more than two millennia, with China as the central state 
and Japan, Korea, and Vietnam on its periphery. This configuration is so ingrained in Chinese 
ways of thinking that the Chinese name for China, Zhongguo, literally means “central state.” 
When outsiders call China the Middle Kingdom, they are just using a version of China’s own 
name for itself. 
 
 
China’s neighbors also recognize the centrality of China in their languages. China is called 
the “central state” or some variation on that theme in Korean, Japanese, and Vietnamese. The 
terms merely reflect the reality that China had always been the dominant country of East 
Asia, the one country that every other country in the system had to work with or against. 
 
Chinese scholars use the Chinese phrase tianxia (“all under heaven”) to describe this 
historical East Asian interstate system centered on China. For Chinese scholars like the 
philosopher Zhao Tingyang and the political scientist Qin Yaqing, tianxia has connotations of 
peaceful coexistence, a harmonious ordering of the world under the benign leadership of the 
central state. Of course, in their vision China will once again be that indispensable central 
state. 
 
 
In this emerging Chinese model of international relations, China will provide moral 
leadership to the global interstate system. China’s central role will be legitimated by the 
openness of institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and reinforced by aid 
given through the generous Belt and Road Initiative. Like the historical Chinese tianxia, the 
twenty-first century Chinese tianxia will based on the voluntary acceptance of Chinese 
leadership. 
 
 
Chinese Concept, American Reality 
 
 
The only problem with this vision is that it’s not true. China’s closest neighbors, the states 
that made up the historical Chinese tianxia, are all wary of China. Japan and South Korea 
host substantial US military forces. Vietnam leans strongly against China and has sought 
closer ties with both the United States and Russia to balance against possible Chinese 
aggression. 
 
 
Other states in the Asia-Pacific region similarly tilt toward the United States. Singapore 
cooperates very closely with the US military. The Philippines is protected by a mutual 
defense pact with the United States. Taiwan effectively relies on the United States for the 
means to defend itself. China has few friends in the region other than North Korea and 
Cambodia, and China itself often seems wary of the unreliable Kim regime in North Korea. 
 
 
All things considered, contemporary East Asia seems to resemble much morean 
American tianxia than a Chinese one. And not just East Asia. America’s NATO allies are 
tightly integrated into US-centered security institutions, and the European Union is in effect 
controlled by NATO countries. Nominally neutral Western European countries like 
Switzerland and Sweden are clearly in the American camp. And though India is careful to 
maintain its foreign policy independence, it seeks to balance China, not to join it. 
 
 
Looking around the world, the list of willing participants in a renewed Chinesetianxia seems 
to be limited to a number of poor, weak, and isolated countries that desperately need the 
kinds of no-strings-attached financial support that only China is willing to give them. 
 
 
Harmonious Order 
 
 
In Chinese Confucian thought, the concept of tianxia represents not just the world as a whole, 
but a harmoniously ordered world. The historical Chinesetianxia was not an empire. It was a 
community. But it was a hierarchically structured community, with non-Confucian barbarians 
at the bottom and the Chinese emperor at the top. 
 
 
In the twenty-first century, the global interstate system forms a hierarchically structured 
community, but this community is not centered on China. It’s centered on the United States. 
In this new American tianxia, the United States is the central state that offers its vision of 
global order to a mostly cooperative world. 
 
 
 
The orientation of most of the world around American-dominated power 
structures is neither fair nor democratic. But it is largely harmonious, and it 
is largely voluntary. 
 
 
Like the historical Chinese tianxia, the contemporary American Tianxia is not an empire, 
with the United States commanding the allegiance of other countries. It is a community, with 
America’s four Anglo-Saxon allies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and most of all the 
United Kingdom) in the inner circle, America’s NATO and Pacific allies in the second circle, 
other aligned countries (like Sweden, Switzerland, and Singapore) in the third circle, and 
friendly non-aligned countries in the fourth circle. 
 
 
Only a small number of the 193 member states of the United Nations are not aligned with or 
at least friendly toward the United States and the interstate system it leads. Some of these 
choose to maintain their policy independence even though they must do so at great cost. The 
most prominent of these is Russia. Others are excluded from the American system due to 
historical enmity with the United States. The most prominent example of these is Iran. 
 
 
It is not yet clear where China stands in this system. Chinese government rhetoric 
combatively asserts Chinse sovereignty, and China has backed this up with an aggressive 
program of island building and forward military deployments in the South China Sea. Yet 
China has become deeply integrated into the larger global economy, relies heavily on foreign 
direct investment from the United States and its allies, and has worked hard to have its 
currency endorsed by the Washington-based International Monetary Fund. 
 
 
Perhaps more importantly, since 1979 China has sent more than 4.2 million students abroad, 
more than half of them to the United States. Around 2.2 million have returned, having 
absorbed Western (and particularly American) ways of thinking. Another 2 million have 
become permanent residents or citizens of their host countries, most of them in North 
America. Now many Chinese women are also traveling to North America to have American 
and Canadian babies. It is hard to imagine China ever seriously opposing the American 
system when so many elite Chinese are themselves part of it. 
 
 
Resentment, not Resistance 
 
 
Specialists in international affairs thrive on conflict — and perceptions of conflict. It should 
come as no surprise that they tend to find conflict everywhere. But it is important to keep a 
sense of perspective. With more than 1,000 direct flights a week between Japan and China, is 
it meaningful to characterize the relationship between the two countries as conflictual? With 
300,000 Chinese students currently studying in the United States, is it meaningful to talk 
about China challenging the American global order? 
 
 
In the world today, there are at least a dozen serious conflicts raging that affect tens of 
millions of people. But for the vast majority of people, including people in Russia, Iran, and 
China, the world is a relatively peaceful place characterized by a clear hierarchical order. 
Thought leaders in Russia, Iran, and China are under no illusions as to the structure of this 
hierarchy. They may object to American dominance, but they do not deny it. Quite the 
contrary: by objecting to it, they admit its objective factuality. 
 
 
The orientation of most of the world around American-dominated power structures is neither 
fair nor democratic. But it is largely harmonious, and it is largely voluntary. In countries like 
Iraq, Libya, and Syria where the United States has used overt military force to attempt to 
install pro-American regimes, it has failed. But the overwhelming majority of countries that 
are free to choose whether or not to align with American power have chosen to do so. 
 
 
Popular movements in many of these countries, including many Western European countries, 
deeply resent the fact that their countries are embedded in a global American tianxia that 
often does not reflect their own values or interests. A major reason for this is the fact that the 
American Tianxia, like the historical Chinese tianxia, is fundamentally undemocratic, and 
lacking any mechanism for input from most of the people who are governed by it. Even many 
Americans believe that their own government lacks proper democratic oversight. 
 
 
These (often legitimate) resentments should not be portrayed as some kind of global conflict 
or revolution in the making. Resentment is not the same as resistance. Many of the peoples of 
historical East Asia probably resented Chinese supremacy. Nonetheless they understood that 
China was the central state that guaranteed the stability of “all under heaven.” Today that 
central state is the United States, and the harmonious order of “all under heaven” in the 
twenty-first century is the American Tianxia. 
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